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Abstract
In this note, the implications of rational addiction theory for the acquisition of habits
and addiction are explored. It is shown that, if age-specific death rates are uniform,
habits should either be acquired at the beginning of life or not at all. By contrast,
under the more realistic assumption that death rates are higher at higher ages, the
rational addiction model implies that any addiction with positive initial benefits
should be taken up as soon as the age-specific death rate is sufficiently high.
The rational addiction model of Becker and Murphy (1988) has stimulated a number of
theoretical and empirical contributions and has been widely cited in the public debate over
issues such as gambling policy (Productivity Commission 1999). The crucial claim made
by Becker and Stigler is that it may be rational for individuals to acquire habits such as
drug addiction, taking full account (in discounted present value terms) of the future costs.
Empirical analysis of the rational addiction hypothesis, has, in general, been based on
statistical tests, in which the null hypothesis is that of myopic behavior, taking no account
of the future consequences of current consumption of addictive goods. In most cases, the
null hypothesis has been rejected (Becker, Grossman and Murphy 1994). However, as noted
by the Productivity Commission (1999),  the fact that behavior is not entirely myopic, does
not imply that it is fully rational. It is, therefore, of interest to consider implications of
the rational addiction hypothesis that may lead to more precise tests of the hypothesis.
Given that the acquisition of a habit may be consistent with the maximization of ra-
tional, dynamically consistent preferences, the question naturally arises as to when it is
rational to acquire the habit. Casual observation suggests that most habits, and particu-
larly most addictions are acquired in adolescence or early adulthood. However, given that
the adverse health and financial consequences of addictions are frequently suffered many
years after the initial consumption benefits are received, the question arises of whether
it would not be more rational to defer the acquisition of addictions towards the end of
the lifespan. Under this plan, the rational individual could enjoy the initial consumption
benefits, but would not be alive to incur the costs.
The relationship between rational addiction models and lifespan has previously been
considered by Levy (2000) hw ose focus is different from that of the present paper. Levy
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considers increased risk of death as a cost of consuming addictive goods and shows that
the individual’s negative appreciation of the addictive stock is reinforced by the increased
risk of death. Hence, the rate of change of the consumption of the addictive commodity
is lower than that obtained when the effect of addiction on the probability of dying is
ignored.
In this note, attention is focused on the decision to acquire a habit. It is shown that,
if age-specific death rates are uniform, habits should either be acquired at the beginning
of life or not at all. By contrast, under the more realistic assumption that death rates are
higher at higher ages, the rational addiction model implies that any addiction with positive
initial benefits should be taken up as soon as the age-specific death rate is sufficiently high.
Since this implication is not consistent with observed behavior, the validity of the rational
addiction model is called into question.
1 Model
Consider an individual with a stochastic lifetime who has the opportunity to consume a
single habit-forming good. Consumption of the good in period t, t = 1,2 . . . is denoted by
ht  E %+.  Utility in period t is given by a time-independent utility function u(ht,  Hi)  where
t>1
is a stock measure of past consumption and the os E  3?+  are non-negative weights. We
normalize by assuming ~(0,  0) = 0. We say that the individual acquires a habit in period
t if ht > 0 and h, = 0, s < t. The habit is fatal at stock level H if ~(0,  H) E 0.l
A habit is a ‘bad’ habit if for all non-zero sequences hi, t = 1,2 . . . , there exists some
t* > 1 such that
u(ht, Hi) <  0, t > t*.
and a‘good’ habit if for all non-zero sequences hi, t = 1,2 . . . , there exists some t* such
that
u(ht, Hi) > 0, t >  t*.
We will rule out trivial cases by assuming that there exists some sequence h, and time-
period t for which u(ht, Hi) > 0. For simplicity, in the case of a bad habit, we will assume
u(hl,  0) >  0.
The individual’s probability of death at time t is denoted dt and is assumed independent
of h and H. Also, for T > t we denote by
i
1  T = t
D; =
1 - n%,+,(l  - A) T >  t
the probability that an individual alive at time t will be dead by time T.
We further assume that the individual displays stationary discounting behavior. That
is, there exists a strictly monotone decreasing vector ,B,,  s = 1,2 . . . , with ,Br  = 1 such
that at each time t, the individual chooses h*= (hT, h$, , , ,) to solve
‘It would be straightforward to extend the model to make the effects of H, including death risks, stochastic,
as in Levy (2000). However, the additional complexity would not yield additional insight into the problem
of interest here.
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such that
t - 1 S-l
HS=xcvs+rL + c d&
r=O r=l
and sets ht = hT.  This formulation allows for both exponential and hyperbolic discounting.
Only in the former case are preferences dynamically consistent.
We now observe that if the probability of death is constant, the individual will either
acquire a habit in period 1 or she will never acquire a habit. Observe that if dt is some
constant 6, DT = (1 - 6)TPt
Theorem 1 If ht,  t = 1,2 . . . solves the problem above, then either
ht = 0 ‘dt;  or
hI  > 0
Proof.-  Consider a consumption sequence in which the individual acquires the habit in period
t > 1.  Then some h*  with hT = ht,  solves the problem at time t
where
But it follows immediately that the same h* is a solution to the individual’s problem at
time 1, contrary to the assumption that the habit is acquired in a later peri0d.H
In the case of exponential discounting, the individual maximizes a single dynamically
consistent objective function and the proof above may be modified to show that, if acquiring
the habit in period t is beneficial, acquiring the habit in period 1 instead of period t raises
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the (necessarily positive) value of the objective function by a factor of l/pi. Note that this
argument applies to all habits, including both good and bad habits.
Theorem 1 appears to fit the stylized facts of habit-formation, in that most habits are
acquired early in adult life or else not acquired at all. However, the assumption that the
age-specific death rate is constant is not consistent with the data. Consider the alternative
hypothesis that dt rises over time, approaching 1 at very high ages. It is easy to see that,
in the case of constant death rates, the higher is the death rate 6, the more attractive are
bad habits and the less attractive are good habits. Intuitively, therefore we might expect
that if the age-specific death rate rises with age, the acquisition of bad habits will become
more attractive as individuals age. In fact, we have:
Theorem 2 (i)Suppose  the habit is a bad habit and dt  is monotone increasing with dt  - 1
ast-co,  andhi,  t=1,2 . . . solves the problem above, then ht > 0 for some t
Proof: Since the habit is a bad habit, for any h* there exists u(hT,  0) > 0. Moreover,
since dt  + l,Dg  + 1, s > t, and we can choose t such that
-&cs 1 - D;)u(h;,  H;) > u(h;,  0)
s=2
so
cc
It follows that the sequence in which the habit given by h* is acquired at time t, will be
chosen in preference to any sequence in which the habit is acquired after time t or not at
all.
In most modern societies, and leaving aside deaths that may be attributed to addictive
or risk-taking behavior, age-specific death rates are low and roughly constant at ages from
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adolescence to middle-age (say 15 to 60) then rise steadily. In cases where the adverse
consequences of addiction are evident within, say 20 years, the analysis above implies a
bifurcated solution. Individuals with high rates of discount or a strong preference for the
consumption benefits of bad habits will acquire those habits early in life. Those with lower,
but still positive, consumption benefits will abstain until an advanced age, then acquire
bad habits as the likelihood of incurring the negative consequences declines. Only those for
whom the initial consumption benefits are negative will be lifelong abstainers. Assuming a
continuous distribution of tastes, in cases where the first and third patterns are observed,
so should the second.
The fact that older people do not appear to acquire dangerous habits with any fre-
quency casts doubt on the rationality of their decisions with respect to the acquisition of
habits. It would be possible to conclude from this that addiction decisions are rational, but
non-addiction decisions are not. This seems unduly paradoxical however. Alternatively, it
would be possible to ‘save the phenomena’ through the use of ad hoc hypotheses. For ex-
ample, it might be assumed that abstention from addictive commodities is itself addictive,
or that young people gain greater utility from the consumption of addictive commodities
than older people. Neither approach seems very appealing.
A more promising interpretation of the results may be derived from the fact that
the same analysis applies both to dynamically consistent and dynamically inconsistent
preferences. As a number of writers have observed , individuals who know themselves
to behave according to dynamically consistent preferences, but who possess higher-order
dynamically consistent preferences, may adopt devices to prevent themselves from making
decisions they will regret in retrospect (Elster 1979). For example, individuals may seek to
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convince themselves that smoking is morally wrong, thereby ensuring immediate negative
consequences from consumption. Having adopted such self-binding devices to preclude
youthful acquisition of bad habits, individuals may find themselves also precluded from
taking up such habits in old age, even if acquisition of a habit would yield an improvement
in expected welfare evaluated using dynamically consistent preferences.
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